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ARTICLES
IDS PRACTICE AFTER THERASENSE AND THE
AIA: DECOUPLING THE LINK BETWEEN
INFORMATION DISCLOSURE AND
INEQUITABLE CONDUCT
Arpita Bhattacharyya† and Michael R. McGurk††
Abstract
The duty to disclose material information to the United States
Patent and Trademark Office under 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (Rule 56) is a
critical requirement when prosecuting a patent application in the
United States. The failure to disclose information can result in a later
ruling of inequitable conduct rendering the patent unenforceable. The
Federal Circuit’s en banc decision in Therasense heightened the
“materiality” and “intent” standards for finding inequitable conduct.
However, there has been much uncertainty in the patent community
regarding the future of the duty of disclosure under Rule 56. The
majority in Therasense theorized that curing the “plague” of
inequitable conduct would solve the over-disclosure problem faced by
the Patent Office. Others, including the dissent in Therasense, argue
that without the threat of inequitable conduct, patent applicants and
practitioners will ignore their duty to disclose and the information
gap between the Patent Office and applicants will widen; this will
result in further impaired patent quality. The supplemental
examination provision in the America Invents Act (AIA), a legislative
cure for the proliferation of inequitable conduct charges, has
heightened the concern among critics that information submission to
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the Patent Office will dwindle.
The Therasense Court’s answer to the over-disclosure problem
and the concerns raised by critics are premised on the notion that
inequitable conduct and the duty of disclosure always go in tandem.
However, inequitable conduct and the duty of disclosure are not
inseparably tied; and, changes in the inequitable conduct landscape
may not have a significant effect on information disclosure practice
before the Patent Office. First, despite the tightening of the
inequitable conduct standard, information submission to the Patent
Office will likely not decrease from the pre-Therasense level. This is
because there are many other incentives within the patent system for
applicants and practitioners to continue to err on the side of overdisclosure. Second, supplemental examination will not sound the
death knell for the duty of disclosure. This is because patentees are
not likely to use this provision to purge willful omissions or
misrepresentations from the examination record. And third, overdisclosure is likely to remain a problem for the Patent Office and
needs to be addressed in other ways. This Article concludes with
suggestions for the Patent Office to consider on how to rein in overdisclosure, while encouraging applicants and practitioners to be
forthcoming with information relevant to patent examination.
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INTRODUCTION

The Code of Federal Regulations, at 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (also
known as Rule 56), establishes a duty of candor and good faith in
dealing with the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(hereinafter “Patent Office”).1 This requires patent applicants and
practitioners to disclose to the Patent Office all information known to
be material to patentability (popularly known as the “duty of
disclosure”). The duty of disclosure attaches to every individual who
is involved with the preparation, filing and/or prosecution of the
patent application.2
Rule 56 is intended to improve the quality of examination and
the validity of patents,3 but its influence is not limited to patent
applications and the examination process. Rule 56 has long guided the
determination of the materiality prong of the inequitable conduct
defense,4 which has had far-reaching effects in patent litigation. A
1.

37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2012).
A patent by its very nature is affected with a public interest. The public
interest is best served, and the most effective patent examination occurs when, at
the time an application is being examined, the Office is aware of and evaluates
the teachings of all information material to patentability. Each individual
associated with the filing and prosecution of a patent application has a duty of
candor and good faith in dealing with the Office, which includes a duty to
disclose to the Office all information known to that individual to be material to
patentability . . . . [N]o patent will be granted on an application in connection
with which fraud on the Office was practiced or attempted or the duty of
disclosure was violated through bad faith or intentional misconduct.

Id.
2. Id.
3. See Rene D. Tegtmeyer, The Patent and Trademark Office View of Inequitable
Conduct or Attempted Fraud in the Patent and Trademark Office, 16 AIPLA Q.J. 88, 88 (1998).
The purpose of the duty of disclosure requirement, as the Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) views it, is to improve the quality of examination and
the validity of patents by assuring that material information is called to the
examiner’s attention and considered in the patent examining process.
Id. Mr. Tegtmeyer is the former Assistant Commissioner of the Patent Office. See also
Christopher A. Cotropia, Modernizing Patent Law’s Inequitable Conduct Doctrine, 24
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 723, 733 (2009).
4. See Christian E. Mammen, Controlling the “Plague”: Reforming the Doctrine of
Inequitable Conduct, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1329, 1334 (2009); Revision of the Materiality to
Patentability Standard for the Duty to Disclose Information in Patent Applications, 76 Fed. Reg.
43,631, 43,632 (proposed July 21, 2011) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
Historically, the Federal Circuit connected the materiality standard for
inequitable conduct with the PTO’s materiality standard for the duty of
disclosure. That is, the Court has invoked the materiality standard for the duty of
disclosure to measure materiality in cases raising claims of inequitable conduct.
In doing so, the Court has utilized both the ‘reasonable examiner’ standard set
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finding of inequitable conduct can render an entire patent family
unenforceable.5 Chief Judge Rader, writing for the majority in
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.,6 famously called the
doctrine of inequitable conduct the “atomic bomb” of patent law.7
Allegations of inequitable conduct form “a dark cloud over the
[litigated] patent’s validity.”8 It increases overall litigation costs,
discourages settlements, portrays the patentee as a “bad actor,” and
can destroy the reputation of patent prosecutors.9
Due to the potential windfalls and lack of disincentives for
alleging inequitable conduct, defendants in patent infringement suits
routinely use this defense as a part of their litigation strategy.10 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal
Circuit”) has long recognized this problem. Judge Nichols in
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Dayco Corp.11 calls it an “absolute
plague” upon the patent litigation system.12
forth in the 1977 version of § 1.56(b) and current § 1.56(b) promulgated in 1992.
See, e.g., Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1363
(Fed. Cir. 1984); Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc. v. Acorn Mobility Servs., Inc.,
394 F.3d 1348, 1352-53 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id.
5. See Bruce D. DeRenzi & Sean E. Jackson, A Procedural Remedy for the “Plague”?
Pleading Inequitable Conduct after Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., N.Y. INTELL. PROP.
L.
ASS’N
BULL.,
Aug.-Sept.
2010,
at
9,
available
at
http://www.nyipla.org/images/nyipla/Documents/Bulletin/2010/August-September2010.pdf; see
also Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., 504 F.3d 1223, 1230 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“[I]nequitable
conduct with respect to one or more patents in a family can infect related applications . . . .”).
6. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
7. Id. at 1288; see also Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334,
1349 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., dissenting).
8. Therasense, Inc., 649 F.3d at 1288; see also Zhe (Amy) Peng et al., A Panacea for
Inequitable Conduct Problems or Kingsdown Version 2.0? The Therasense Decision and a Look
into the Future of U.S. Patent Law Reform, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 373, 398 (2011).
9. Therasense, Inc., 649 F.3d at 1288; Peng et al., supra note 8, at 398.
10. See Therasense, Inc., 649 F.3d at 1289 (“One study estimated that eighty percent of
patent infringement cases included allegations of inequitable conduct. . . . Inequitable conduct
‘has been overplayed, is appearing in nearly every patent suit, and is cluttering up the patent
system.’”) (citation omitted); Kevin Mack, Note, Reforming Inequitable Conduct to Improve
Patent Quality: Cleansing Unclean Hands, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 147, 155–56 & tbl.1(2006)
(noting that the inequitable conduct defense is adjudicated in sixteen to thirty-five percent of all
infringement cases that make it to trial and inferring that the percentage of cases in which
defendants plead inequitable conduct, but do not make it to trial, is substantially higher).
11. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
12. Id. at 1422 (“[T]he habit of charging inequitable conduct in almost every major patent
case has become an absolute plague. Reputable lawyers seem to feel compelled to make the
charge against other reputable lawyers on the slenderest grounds, to represent their client’s
interests adequately, perhaps.” (emphasis added)).
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The proliferation of inequitable conduct charges has led patent
applicants and practitioners to err on the side of over-disclosure in
their Information Disclosure Statement (IDS) practices,13 which some
argue reduces the quality of patent examination.14 The Therasense
Court expressed concern that the specter of inequitable conduct
allegations has caused many patent applicants and practitioners to
overflow the Patent Office with a “deluge of prior art references, most
of which have marginal value,” in order to avoid inequitable conduct
allegations.15 The Court further noted that over-disclosure puts
unnecessary strain on the Patent Office’s limited examining
resources, increases backlog, and ultimately hurts the quality of
patents issued by the Office.16
The Federal Circuit recognized the problems created by the
expansion and overuse of the inequitable conduct doctrine. It
addressed the issue en banc in Therasense with an eye towards curing
the “plague” of inequitable conduct.17 It is far too early to tell whether
the standards articulated in Therasense will restrain the proliferation
of inequitable conduct charges, and consequently reduce the incentive

13. It is widely accepted that the drastic consequences of an inequitable conduct finding
motivates applicants and practitioners to submit any reference that has the slightest connection
to the invention, which causes detrimental information overload and hurts patent quality. See,
e.g., Cotropia, supra note 3, at 768 (“The most common method of overcomplying under the
current legal regime is to submit everything of even remote relevance in one’s possession to the
USPTO.”); John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal
for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 315 (2001) (“Where the applicant is already well
informed of the prior art, the specter of inequitable conduct too often causes applicants to submit
virtually every reference of which they are aware.”). But see Dennis Crouch & Jason Rantanen,
References
Cited,
PATENTLY-O
(Feb.
19,
2009),
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/02/references-cite.html (stating that analysis of applicant
disclosure rates from January 1, 2009 to February 18, 2009 revealed that applicants submit over
200 references in only 2% of cases, and 15% of patented cases include absolutely no applicantcited references).
14. See Cotropia, supra note 3, at 770-72.
15. Therasense, Inc., 649 F.3d at 1289. The court expressed concern that the preTherasense inequitable conduct doctrine required patent applicants to over-disclose, resulting in
a flood of references with questionable materiality. The court’s opinion shows that the
relationship between inequitable conduct and over-disclosure was effectively advocated by
amici. Id. (citing the briefs submitted by the United States and the Biotechnology Industry
Organization).
16. See id. at 1290 (“While honesty at the PTO is essential, low standards for intent and
materiality have inadvertently led to many unintended consequences, among them, increased
adjudication cost and complexity, reduced likelihood of settlement, burdened courts, strained
PTO resources, increased PTO backlog, and impaired patent quality.”).
17. See id. (“This court now tightens the standards for finding both intent and materiality
in order to redirect a doctrine that has been overused to the detriment of the public.”).
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for patent applicants to inundate the Patent Office with marginally
relevant information.
There remain many detractors, including the dissent in
Therasense, who argue that without the threat of inequitable conduct,
patent applicants and practitioners will have no incentive to comply
with the Rule 56 duty of disclosure.18 The AIA’s supplemental
examination provision, also designed to reduce inequitable conduct
charges, has heightened the concern that information submission to
the Patent Office will decrease substantially and impair the quality of
patents.19
The common belief among the Therasense majority and the
critics of inequitable conduct reform is that inequitable conduct and
information disclosure are inseparably tied. The authors argue that
this logic is flawed because inequitable conduct and information
disclosure to the Patent Office do not always go in tandem.
First, information disclosure to the Patent Office will probably
not decrease from the pre-Therasense level. This is because there are
many factors, aside from the fear of inequitable conduct allegation,
that incentivize patent applicants and practitioners to bring prior art
references to the attention of the Patent Office. For instance, such
submissions bolster a patent against post-issuance challenges at the
Patent Office and strengthen the presumption of validity that attaches
to an issued patent. These factors will continue to serve as incentives
for patent applicants and practitioners to bring material—and perhaps
even marginally relevant information—to the attention of the Patent
Office during prosecution. The “egregious misconduct” caveat in
Therasense, and the uncertainty surrounding the type of affirmative
act that is likely to rise to the level of egregious misconduct, will
highly motivate patent applicants and practitioners to adhere to their

18. See id. at 1306 (Bryson, J., dissenting) (“It is unrealistic to expect that other means
will provide an effective deterrent to ensure that material information will not be withheld
during patent prosecutions. The PTO advises us that the prospect of enforcing the duty of
disclosure other than through the threat of inequitable conduct claims is not possible or
practical.”); Peng et al., supra note 8, at 398; Jason Rantanen & Lee Petherbridge, Therasense v.
Becton Dickinson: A First Impression, 14 YALE J.L & TECH. 226, 256 (2012).
19. Lisa A. Dolak, America Invents the Supplemental Examination, But Retains the Duty
of Candor: Questions and Implications, 6 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 147, 168 (2012); Jason
Rantanen, Lee Petherbridge & Jay P. Kesan, America Invents, More or Less?, 160 U. PA. L.
REV. PENNUMBRA 229, 244 (2012); Jason Rantanen & Lee Petherbridge, Toward a System of
Invention Registration: The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 110 MICH. L. REV. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS 24 (2011), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/110/rantanenpetherbridge.
pdf.
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pre-Therasense diligence in submitting information to the Patent
Office. Specifically, the practice of over-disclosing is often less risky
and more cost-effective to an applicant than determining the
materiality of all known references. Therefore, many applicants and
practitioners will simply continue with their pre-Therasense IDS
practices instead of taking on the added costs and risks associated
with subjectively evaluating the materiality of each and every known
prior art reference.
Second, the AIA’s supplemental examination is not likely to
change the amount and quality of the information disclosure to the
Patent Office. It is highly doubtful that patent applicants or
practitioners will purposefully misrepresent or withhold relevant
information during prosecution, then present the same information to
the Patent Office after issuance via supplemental examination. A
patentee will have very little to gain from such deceitful behavior,
particularly because of the high likelihood of ex parte reexamination
being prompted by a supplemental examination request and the risks
associated with reexamination. The fraud provision in supplemental
examination combined with the cost associated with this process will
also deter abuse of the provision to cure knowing and deliberate
omissions.
Lastly, it seems highly unlikely that the changes in the
inequitable conduct landscape, as a result of Therasense and the AIA,
will stem from the overflow of information to the Patent Office. This
is because the costs and risks associated with under-disclosure are
very high compared to that of over-compliance with the duty of
disclosure. Unless addressed by the Patent Office in other ways, the
problem of over-disclosure is likely to continue unabated. This Article
proposes some changes to the Information Disclosure Statement
(IDS) requirements of the Patent Office to discourage over-disclosure,
limit undue strain on the examination resources of the Patent Office,
and improve the quality of patents.
II. INEQUITABLE CONDUCT AND THE DUTY OF DISCLOSURE:
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Part II of this Article first explores the evolution of the law of
inequitable conduct, with a particular focus on post-Therasense
Federal Circuit cases that help to clarify the current standards for
materiality and intent required for finding inequitable conduct.
Second, the amendments to Rule 56 that have been proposed by the
Patent Office following the Therasense decision are discussed. And
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finally, the supplemental examination provision of the AIA, which is
likely to have a substantial impact on inequitable conduct litigation, is
considered.
A. The Law of Inequitable Conduct
Inequitable conduct20 is a judicially created defense to patent
infringement that evolved from the equitable doctrine of unclean
hands.21 Thus, inequitable conduct requires inequity arising from a
patentee’s actions or deliberate omissions before the Patent Office in
the course of obtaining a patent.22
1. Inequitable Conduct Doctrine before Therasense
To successfully assert the defense of inequitable conduct, an
alleged infringer must show that the patentee “(1) made an affirmative
misrepresentation of material fact, failed to disclose material
information, or submitted false material information, and (2) intended
to deceive” the Patent Office during prosecution of the patent
application.23 If the court determines that the threshold levels of both
materiality and intent are met, then the court must balance materiality
and intent “with a greater showing of one factor allowing a lesser
showing of the other.”24 In other words, the court could equitably
balance the evidence of intent and materiality to determine whether
the patentee’s conduct was sufficiently culpable to warrant rendering

20. For scholarship on inequitable conduct, see generally Cotropia, supra note 3, at 73337; Robert J. Goldman, Evolution of the Inequitable Conduct Defense in Patent Litigation, 7
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 37, 49-50 (1993); Brett Ira Johnson, The Inequitable Conduct Defense in
Patent Litigation: Where We Are, Where We Have Been, and Where We Should Go from Here,
28 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 197, 198 (2012); John F. Lynch, An Argument
for Eliminating the Defense of Patent Unenforceability Based on Inequitable Conduct, 16
AIPLA Q.J. 7, 8 (1988); Mack, supra note 10, at 156-61; Mammen, supra note 4, at 1332; Lee
Petherbridge, Jason Rantanen & Ali Mojibi, The Federal Circuit and Inequitable Conduct: An
Empirical Assessment, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1295-1303 (2011).
21. See Mammen, supra note 4, at 1333. See also Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto.
Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814 (1945) (discussing that the doctrine of unclean hands
evolved from requirements of conscience and good faith, and gives a court of equity discretion
to close its doors to claimants who are tainted with inequitableness or bad faith).
22. See Cotropia, supra note 3, at 733-35 (discussing the requirements of the inequitable
conduct doctrine); 4 ROBERT A. MATTHEWS, ANNOTATED PATENT DIGEST § 27:58 (2012)
(titled “Overview of the Requirement of Intent to Deceive”).
23. Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1365 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (quoting Cargill, Inc. v. Canbra Foods, Ltd., 476 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
24. Digital Control Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(quoting Union Pac. Res. Co. v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., 236 F.3d 684, 693 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
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the entire patent unenforceable.25 Under the balancing test, courts
assessed inequitable conduct using a “sliding scale” of intent and
materiality.26 This established a legal notion that a reduced showing
of intent could be offset by a strong showing of materiality, and vice
versa. 27 The “sliding scale” doctrine blurs the fact that materiality and
intent are separate elements; the threshold levels for both of these
elements must be established by the party alleging inequitable
conduct. Because it is usually difficult to find express evidence of
intent to deceive, the lowered standard for intent made inequitable
conduct allegations very attractive to defendants.
With Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc.,28 the
Federal Circuit attempted to stem the growing tide of inequitable
conduct cases. The Kingsdown Court overturned prior precedent that
held that a showing of “gross negligence” was sufficient to meet the
intent to deceive prong of inequitable conduct, and instead, the court
established a “sufficient culpability” standard.29
Nevertheless, over the last decade the proliferation of the
inequitable conduct defense has proven difficult to control. Several
post-Kingsdown Federal Circuit decisions gradually chipped away at
the “sufficient culpability” standard and reduced it to a mere “should
have known” standard,30 which is arguably a lower standard than the
pre-Kingsdown “gross negligence” standards. For instance, in Ferring
B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc,31 the court held that a patentee’s failure to
25. See Monsanto Co. v. Bayer BioScience N.V., 363 F.3d 1235, 1239 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
26. Peng et al., supra note 8, at 378 (citing Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons,
Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1984), abrogated by Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson
& Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).
27. See id. (explaining that the “sliding scale” was interpreted by courts to mean that if
the undisclosed or misrepresented information was highly material, there need not be much clear
and convincing evidence of intent to deceive).
28. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
29. Id. at 876.
We adopt the view that a finding that particular conduct amounts to ‘gross
negligence’ does not of itself justify an inference of intent to deceive; the
involved conduct, viewed in light of all the evidence, including evidence
indicative of good faith, must indicate sufficient culpability to require a finding
of intent to deceive.
Id. (citing Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779 (C.C.P.A. 1970)).
30. Mammen, supra note 4, at 1331. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. RhonePoulenc Rorer, Inc., 326 F.3d 1226, 1239-40 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[W]here withheld information is
material and the patentee knew or should have know[n] of that materiality, he or she can expect
to have great difficulty in establishing subjective good faith sufficient to overcome an inference
of intent to mislead.” (emphasis added)).
31. Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc, 437 F.3d 1181 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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disclose his prior business relationship with declarants (who provided
affidavits in support of patentability during prosecution) was a
material misrepresentation to the Patent Office.32 Since the applicant
“knew or should have known” that the undisclosed relationship was
material, the intent-to-deceive prong was also satisfied.33
The materiality standard for finding inequitable conduct has also
flip-flopped considerably since Kingsdown. Even though Rule 56 had
been modified following Kingsdown to replace the “reasonable
examiner” standard with a more objective set of rules, the Federal
Circuit resurrected the pre-1992 “reasonable examiner” standard in
Digital Control.34 In McKesson Information Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge
Medical, Inc.,35 decided in 2007, the Federal Circuit held that the
rejection of claims during prosecution of one patent is material to the
prosecution of a co-pending application if “a reasonable examiner
would substantially likely consider [such information] important in
deciding whether to allow an application to issue as a patent.”36 And
if there was any uncertainty left after Digital Control and McKesson,
the Federal Circuit in 2008 clarified in Star Scientific that the
“reasonable examiner” test was the controlling standard for
materiality.37
The vague and inconsistently defined standards for materiality
and intent since Kingsdown, combined with the powerful remedy
incentives, resulted in overuse of the inequitable conduct defense.38
The expansion of the doctrine in turn fueled over-compliance with the
duty of disclosure, resulting in detrimental information overload on
the Patent Office.39

32. See id. at 1188, 1190-91.
33. Id.
34. Digital Control Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(stating that the “reasonable examiner” standard should continue to exist as one of the tests for
materiality).
35. McKesson Info. Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Med., Inc., 487 F.3d 897 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
36. Id. at 913 (quoting Akron Polymer Container Corp. v. Exxel Container, Inc., 148 F.3d
1380, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
37. Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1367 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (reciting only the “reasonable examiner” standard for materiality).
38. See Mammen, supra note 4, at 1361 (discussing that the prevalence of the inequitable
conduct cases has expanded as a result of the overbroad doctrine).
39. See Cotropia, supra note 3, at 767-72 (discussing the high-cost of non-compliance
and the low cost of compliance as causing overcompliance, which ultimately hurts patent
quality).
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2. Inequitable Conduct Doctrine under Therasense
Citing the ubiquity of the inequitable conduct defense and its farreaching consequences on both patent prosecution and litigation, the
Federal Circuit sitting en banc in Therasense addressed the issue of
inequitable conduct charges that have been “overused to the detriment
of the public.”40
The Therasense Court raised the standard for finding inequitable
conduct in three principal ways. Starting with the intent to deceive
prong, the majority decided that an accused infringer must prove that
the patentee acted with a “specific intent” to deceive the Patent
Office.41 Under the new test, intent can be established only by clear
and convincing evidence that (1) the applicant knew of the reference,
(2) knew it was material, and (3) made a deliberate decision to
withhold it.42 Gross negligence or proving that the applicant “should
have known” that the reference was material is not sufficient to
establish the intent prong of the inequitable conduct charge.43
Second, the Therasense Court determined that “the materiality
required to establish inequitable conduct is a “but-for” materiality.”44
In other words, information undisclosed by the applicant is deemed
material only if the Patent Office would not have allowed a claim had
it been aware of the undisclosed information.45 In making this “butfor” materiality determination, the Federal Circuit directed the district
courts to apply the preponderance of the evidence standard used by
the Patent Office, not the clear and convincing standard used by
courts in determining patent invalidity.46 After describing the
heightened standard for materiality, the Federal Circuit recognized an
exception to the “but-for” standard for “cases of affirmative egregious
conduct,” such as the submission of false affidavits, manufacturing of
false evidence, perjury, suppression of evidence, and bribery.47
Finally, the Federal Circuit abolished the “sliding scale” test and
explained that materiality and intent are separate elements that cannot

40. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
41. Id. (citing Star Scientific, Inc., 537 F.3d at 1366).
42. Id.
43. Id. (citing Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876
(Fed. Cir. 1988)).
44. Id. at 1291.
45. See id.
46. Id. at 1291-92.
47. Id. at 1292-93.
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be inferred from or weighed against each other.48 In particular, the
Federal Circuit found that “to meet the clear and convincing evidence
standard, the specific intent to deceive must be ‘the single most
reasonable inference able to be drawn from the evidence.’”49 That is,
if multiple reasonable inferences may be drawn from a piece of
evidence, intent to deceive cannot be found.50
After the Federal Circuit’s Therasense decision, the defendants
did not petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court. The Therasense decision is the law of the land, at least for
now. Several post-Therasense Federal Circuit cases discussed below
elucidate the new materiality and intent standards for finding
inequitable conduct.
a. Materiality Standard under Therasense
In American Calcar, Inc. v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.,51
the Federal Circuit’s first post-Therasense case addressing the issue
of inequitable conduct, the Court explained that to prove inequitable
conduct the accused infringer must provide evidence that the
applicant (1) misrepresented or omitted material information, and (2)
did so with the specific intent-to-deceive the PTO.52 The Court further
explained that the misrepresented or omitted information must be
“but-for” material to the patent at issue under the Therasense
standard.53 Applying this standard, the Federal Circuit agreed with
defendants that the undisclosed information was “but-for” material to
one of the asserted patents.54 This was because the district court had
found that the asserted claims of that patent are anticipated by the
undisclosed information.55 With regard to a second set of asserted
patents, the Court found that although the jury rejected defendant’s
invalidity arguments based on the undisclosed information, the
withheld information could still have been “but-for” material if it
would have blocked issuance of the patent claims under the Patent
Office’s preponderance of the evidence standard, giving those claims
48. Id. at 1290.
49. Id. at 1290-91 (quoting Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d
1357, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
50. See id.
51. Am. Calcar, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 651 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
52. Id. at 1334.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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their broadest reasonable construction.56 Because the Court was not
able to infer that finding from the district court’s opinion, it vacated
the district court’s findings of materiality as to the second set of
patents and remanded the issue.57
In August Technology Corp. v. Camtek, Ltd.,58 the Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Camtek’s inequitable
conduct defense. It reasoned that an undisclosed reference was not
“but-for” material prior art because it would not have rendered the
claims of the asserted patent obvious in view of the other prior art
references of record.59 Specifically, the district court had found that
one of applicant’s devices, information about which was not disclosed
to the Patent Office during examination, was not on sale prior to the
critical date of the asserted patent, and therefore, the undisclosed
information was not prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).60 The district
court dismissed as moot defendant’s inequitable conduct charge.61 On
appeal, the Federal Circuit found that even if the undisclosed device
was on sale and constituted prior art, it would not render the asserted
claims obvious in view of the other cited prior art.62 On this basis, the
Court concluded that the undisclosed information was not material
prior art under the but-for materiality standard set forth in Therasense.
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of
defendant’s inequitable conduct counterclaim.63
In Powell v. Home Depot USA Inc.,64 the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court’s finding that a patent applicant’s failure to
notify the Patent Office of a change in status for a Petition to Make
Special is neither a ground for finding of inequitable conduct under
the “but-for” material standard, nor does it constitute “affirmative
egregious misconduct” under Therasense.65
56. Id. at 1335.
57. Id.
58. August Tech. Corp. v. Camtek, Ltd., 655 F.3d 1278, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
59. Id. at 1290.
60. Id. at 1288.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1290.
63. Id. (citing Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1291-92
(Fed. Cir. 2011)).
64. Powell v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 663 F.3d 1221, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
65. Id. at 1235.
Where, as here, the patent applicant fails to update the record to inform the
PTO that the circumstances which support a Petition to Make Special no longer
exist—that conduct does not constitute inequitable conduct. . . . . That is so
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In light of the post-Therasense Federal Circuit cases, the “butfor” material standard can be viewed as requiring a defendant to show
by a preponderance of the evidence that one or more claims of the
asserted patent would have been anticipated or rendered obvious if the
patent examiner had been aware of the undisclosed (or
misrepresented) information.
b. Intent to Deceive Standard under Therasense
In American Calcar, the Federal Circuit’s first inequitable
conduct case after Therasense, the Court concluded that the district
court applied an incorrect standard in determining intent to deceive
the Patent Office by the applicant.66 The Court explained that under
the Therasense standard, “the accused infringer must prove by clear
and convincing evidence that the applicant knew of the reference,
knew that it was material, and made a deliberate decision to withhold
it.”67 The Court found that the district court had relied on the sliding
scale standard that was rejected en banc in Therasense.68 Accordingly,
the Court vacated the district court’s finding of intent and remanded
the issue.69
Similarly, in Cordis Corp. v. Boston Scientific Corp.,70 the
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding of lack of
inequitable conduct, because the defendant had failed to prove
deceptive intent by clear and convincing evidence as required under
Therasense.71

because Mr. Powell’s conduct obviously fails the but-for materiality standard and
is not the type of unequivocal act, ‘such as the filing of an unmistakably false
affidavit,’ that would rise to the level of ‘affirmative egregious misconduct.’
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Therasense, Inc., 649 F.3d at 1292-93).
66. Am. Calcar, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 651 F.3d 1318, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
67. Id. (quoting Therasense, Inc., 649 F.3d at 1290) (internal quotation marks omitted).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Cordis Corp. v. Bos. Scientific Corp., 658 F.3d 1347, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
71. Id. at 1361. The Federal Circuit explained in a footnote:
This appears to be a case where [defendant] proved the threshold level of
intent to deceive, but that proof was rebutted by [applicant’s] good faith
explanation. . . . [Defendant’s] argument therefore hinges, as it did below, on
[applicant’s] credibility. . . . [I]t was the province of the district court to
determine credibility, and ‘[t]his court gives great deference to the district court’s
decisions regarding credibility of witnesses.’
Id. n.6 (last alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison
Co., 227 F.3d 1361, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
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In Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Hospira, Inc.,72 the Federal Circuit for
the first time since Therasense affirmed a holding by the district court
that rendered two of the asserted patents unenforceable due to
inequitable conduct. Materiality was not an issue on appeal, because
the district court had invalidated the patents using the undisclosed
references.73 Regarding the intent to deceive prong, the Federal
Circuit upheld the district court’s rejection of the inventor’s rationale
for withholding certain references.74 The Court explained that
Therasense “confirmed that inequitable conduct requires clear and
convincing evidence of a specific intent to deceive the [Patent Office]
and that the specific intent to deceive must be the single most
reasonable inference able to be drawn from the evidence.”75 While the
inventor testified that he withheld the references because they
described only “failed experiments,” the Court noted the contrary
evidence in the record and the district court’s finding that the
inventor’s testimony lacked credibility.76 It held that the district
court’s finding of specific intent to deceive the Patent Office was not
clearly erroneous.77
Based on the outcomes of the post-Therasense inequitable
conduct cases before the Federal Circuit, it is now clear that
determination of inequitable conduct requires distinct findings of
intent and materiality, rather than employing the sliding scale
approach, and that deceptive intent has to be established by clear and
convincing evidence. Despite the more rigorous intent standard
adopted in Therasense, at least the Aventis Pharma case demonstrates
that the Federal Circuit is willing to affirm well-reasoned and
unequivocal findings of intent to deceive the Patent Office.
Time will tell how much Therasense changes the inequitable
conduct landscape in a manner envisioned by the majority. In the
meantime, the Patent Office has taken a position consistent with the
Therasense majority that the change in the inequitable conduct
standard will minimize the impulse to over-comply with the duty of
disclosure. The Patent Office has also proposed to revise Rule 56 to
reduce the incentive to inundate it with marginally relevant
72. Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Hospira, Inc., 675 F.3d 1324, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
73. Id. at 1334.
74. Id. at 1335-37.
75. Id. at 1335 (quoting Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276,
1290 (Fed. Cir. 2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
76. Id. at 1335-37.
77. Id.
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information.
B. Post-Therasense Changes to Rule 56
In 1989, a year after the Kingsdown decision that heightened the
standard for finding inequitable conduct, the Patent Office proposed
amendments to Rule 56 seeking to replace the “reasonable examiner”
standard with a clearer and more objective set of rules.78 In 1992, the
Patent Office adopted the amended version of Rule 56, which remains
in place today.79
Historically, the Federal Circuit has followed the Patent Office’s
materiality standard for the duty of disclosure to measure materiality
for inequitable conduct claims.80 In the past decade, however, the
Federal Circuit has only loosely followed the standard for materiality
adopted in the 1992 version of Rule 56.81 In Digital Control, the
Federal Circuit reverted back to the “reasonable examiner” standard
and reasoned that the 1992 version of Rule 56 was “not intended to
replace or supplant the ‘reasonable examiner’ standard.”82
Following Therasense, the Patent Office has once again
proposed to revise Rule 56.83 It hopes to mend the disjunction
between the Federal Circuit’s materiality standard for inequitable
conduct and the Patent Office’s materiality standard for the duty of
disclosure.84 The proposed amendment to Rule 56 would define that
information is material to patentability under Therasense if it falls
under the “but-for-plus” standard, i.e., (1) the Patent Office would not
allow a claim if it were aware of the information, applying the
preponderance of the evidence standard and giving the claim its
broadest reasonable construction; or (2) the applicant engages in
affirmative egregious misconduct before the Patent Office as to the

78. See Duty of Disclosure, 56 Fed. Reg. 37,321 (proposed Aug. 6, 1991) (to be codified
at 37 C.F.R. pts. 1 & 10).
79. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2012); Duty of Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 2021 (Jan. 17,
1992) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pts. 1 & 10).
80. See Revision of the Materiality to Patentability Standard for the Duty to Disclose
Information in Patent Applications, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,631, 43,631 (proposed July 21, 2011) (to be
codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
81. Mammen, supra note 4, at 1334-35.
82. See Digital Control Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1316 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (identifying the Patent Office’s material to patentability standard as one of the many
standards the courts could apply).
83. Revision of the Materiality to Patentability Standard, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,631.
84. Id.
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information.85 Moreover, “neither mere nondisclosure of information
to the Office nor failure to mention information in an affidavit,
declaration, or other statement to the Office constitutes affirmative
egregious misconduct.”86
The Patent Office emphasized that its proposed changes to Rule
56 was voluntary and not required by Therasense.87 This is because
the Patent Office’s materiality standard and the court’s inequitable
conduct standard are “not inseparably tied.”88 Nevertheless, the Patent
Office noted that harmonization of the two materiality standards had
several benefits.89 In particular, the Patent Office stated that it expects
the “but-for-plus” standard from Therasense to “result in patent
applicants providing the most relevant information and reduce the
incentive for applicants to submit information disclosure statements
containing only marginally relevant information out of an abundance
of caution.”90 At the same time, by creating an exception to punish
affirmative egregious acts without penalizing mere failure to disclose
information that would not have changed the issuance decision, the
“but-for-plus” standard “will continue to prevent applicants from
deceiving the Office and breaching their duty of candor and good
faith.”91 Additionally, the Patent Office stated that it believes a
unitary materiality standard would be simpler for the patent bar to
implement.92
It is yet to be seen whether the proposed amendments to Rule 56
would have any impact on IDS practices. It is unclear whether they
would solve the over-disclosure problem as anticipated by the
Therasense majority and the Patent Office.
C. Supplemental Examination
Another recent development that lies at the intersection of Rule
56 and inequitable conduct is the AIA’s supplemental examination,
which also was designed to reduce the rampant overuse of inequitable
conduct charges in patent litigation. The supplemental examination
provision of the AIA, enacted on September 16, 2011, provides a
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 43,632.
Id. at 43,633.
Id. at 43,632.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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patentee with an avenue to ask the Patent Office “to consider,
reconsider, or correct information believed to be relevant to [a]
patent”93 at any time after the issuance of that patent. This provision
took effect on September 16, 2012; it applies to any patent issued
before, on, or after that date.94
Supplemental examination allows the patentee to have
information that was not considered during the initial examination of
the patent to be considered after the grant of the patent. Once such
information is considered, the patent cannot be held unenforceable on
the basis of conduct relating to such information.95 That is, the
patentee is shielded from allegations of inequitable conduct stemming
from the information that was presented to the Patent Office in the
supplemental examination request. There is also a possibility that the
patentee can get protection from sweeping discovery of information
related to the supplemental examination. If the information submitted
in the supplemental examination request raises a substantial new
question of patentability, the patent shall be subjected to
reexamination according to the current ex parte reexamination rules.96

93. 35 U.S.C. § 257(a) (2011).
Request for supplemental examination.—A patent owner may request
supplemental examination of a patent in the Office to consider, reconsider, or
correct information believed to be relevant to the patent, in accordance with such
requirements as the Director may establish. Within 3 months after the date a
request for supplemental examination meeting the requirements of this section is
received, the Director shall conduct the supplemental examination and shall
conclude such examination by issuing a certificate indicating whether the
information presented in the request raises a substantial new question of
patentability.
Id.
94. Peter G. Thurlow & Maya Elbert, Inequitable Conduct: Analysis of Post-Therasense
Court Decisions and the Supplemental Examination Provision of the America Invents Act,
BLOOMBERG L. REPS.: INTELL. PROP., Nov. 16, 2011, at 3, available at
http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/4501f180-8a8d-4c84-8c992c0c93e79ed1/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/a67e906e-d07d-4c06-b73698c68fe8d60e/Bloomberg.pdf.
95. See 35 U.S.C. § 257(c)(1) (2011).
In general.—A patent shall not be held unenforceable on the basis of conduct
relating to information that had not been considered, was inadequately
considered, or was incorrect in a prior examination of the patent if the
information was considered, reconsidered, or corrected during a supplemental
examination of the patent. The making of a request under subsection (a), or the
absence thereof, shall not be relevant to enforceability of the patent under section
282.
Id.
96. Id. § 257(b).
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To take advantage of the “shielding effect” of supplemental
examination, the patentee must request supplemental examination
before a patent challenger raises an allegation of inequitable conduct
in a declaratory judgment action or an Abbreviated New Drug
Application (ANDA) notice.97 In a patent enforcement action, the
patentee is insulated from inequitable conduct allegations only if the
examination (including reexamination of the patent pursuant to the
supplemental examination request) is concluded before the date on
which the action is brought.98
Supplemental examination can be helpful in maximizing the
value of a patent in the following situations: (1) to address certain
information that came to the attention of the patentee between
allowance and issuance without having to resort to a Request for
Continued Examination (RCE); (2) to address the concerns of
investors and potential partners during a due diligence investigation,
valuation, or licensing negotiations; and (3) to cure issues that may be
raised by an adverse party challenging the enforceability of the patent.
Supplemental examination is a powerful tool to address
problems with issued patents. The patent community anticipates that
as part of a pre-litigation strategy, supplemental examination will give
patentees an opportunity to reduce or eliminate known weaknesses in
their patents prior to initiating a patent infringement action.99 This
will minimize the chances of the patent being held unenforceable due
to inequitable conduct.100 Thus, supplemental examination can be said
to be the AIA’s cure for the “plague” of inequitable conduct.
III. THE IMPACT OF INEQUITABLE CONDUCT REFORM ON
INFORMATION DISCLOSURE
With Therasense, the Federal Circuit created a new, heightened
standard for finding inequitable conduct. The new standard for
materiality and intent under Therasense, coupled with the heightened
standard for pleading inequitable conduct under Exergen Corp. v.

97. Id. § 257(c)(2)(A); see also Clara N. Jimenez & Rebecca M. McNeill, Using
Supplemental Examination Effectively to Strengthen the Value of Your Patents, 82 PAT.,
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 751 (Sept. 30, 2011), available at
http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=0aa7d6b6-e467-46f6b9e8-3ace89e1f58e.
98. 35 U.S.C. § 257(c)(2)(B).
99. Jimenez & McNeill, supra note 97.
100. Id.
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Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,101 is expected to make pleading and proving
inequitable conduct much harder for defendants.
In addition to raising the bar for finding inequitable conduct,
Therasense is expected to provide clearer guidance to patent
applicants and practitioners on what information must be submitted to
the Patent Office during prosecution. According to the Therasense
majority, the “but-for” materiality framework provides “clear
guidance to patent practitioners and courts, while the egregious
misconduct exception gives the test sufficient flexibility to capture
extraordinary circumstances.”102 The Patent Office has similarly
expressed the hope that Therasense will reduce the rampant overuse
of inequitable conduct, consequently reducing the incentive to file
Information Disclosure Statements (IDSs) laden with “marginally
relevant” information.103
Despite the confidence exuded by the Patent Office that
applicants will continue to be forthcoming with information relevant
to patent examination,104 many commentators have expressed concern
that without the threat of inequitable conduct, patent applicants and
practitioners will have no incentive to disclose relevant information to
the Patent Office.105 The Patent Office’s lack of resources and
expertise to monitor, adjudicate and enforce compliance with Rule 56
adds fuel to the concern that the heightened standard for inequitable
conduct will simply widen the information asymmetry between patent
examiners and applicants.106
Regardless of the diminished threat of inequitable conduct
allegations and/or findings, there are many reasons for patent
applicants and practitioners to not change their pre-Therasense
prosecution practices. First, the patent system inherently has many

101. Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (adopting
strict pleading standards for the defense of inequitable conduct, which required deceptive intent
to be pleaded with particularity).
102. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
103. See Revision of the Materiality to Patentability Standard for the Duty to Disclose
Information in Patent Applications, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,631, 43,631 (proposed July 21, 2011) (to be
codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
104. Id.
105. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
106. See Lisa Dolak, supra note 19, at 170 & n.111 (citing Harry F. Manbeck, Jr.,
Evolution and Future of New Rule 56 and the Duty of Candor: The Evolution and Issue of New
Rule 56, 20 AIPLA Q.J. 136, 138–40 (1992)) (noting that the Patent Office had previously
determined it was ill-equipped to investigate possible instances of fraud that came to its
attention); Therasense, Inc., 649 F.3d at 1306 (Bryson, J., dissenting).
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incentives for patent applicants to continue submitting relevant
information to the Patent Office, albeit with less fear of an inequitable
conduct allegation and/or finding if an ensuing patent is litigated.
Second, the egregious misconduct caveat in Therasense will spur
patent applicants and practitioners to continue with any preTherasense diligence in submitting information to the Patent Office.
Third, there are many economic incentives for patent applicants and
practitioners to continue with their pre-Therasense IDS practices.
Additionally, supplemental examination is not likely to reduce
information submission to the Patent Office because supplemental
examination is not a “get out of jail free card.”107
A. Therasense Will Not Stifle Information Flow to the Patent
Office
The threat of an inequitable conduct allegation is not the only
impetus driving patent applicants and practitioners to abide by their
duty of disclosure to the Patent Office. Although the Therasense
decision and the supplemental examination provision are expected to
shield many applicants and practitioners from successful inequitable
conduct charges, there are many other reasons for them to continue
submitting information to the Patent Office.
1. Incentives within the Patent System to Comply with the
Duty of Disclosure
Patent applicants and practitioners have always had, and will
continue to have, many good reasons, aside from the threat of
inequitable conduct allegation, to present information to the Patent
Office during prosecution.
a. Bolstering against Post-Issuance Challenges at the
Patent Office
The AIA introduces two new inter partes mechanisms, namely,
post-grant review and inter partes review, for levying challenges to
the validity of a granted patent at the Patent Office. These post-grant
proceedings are relatively inexpensive compared to litigation, and
therefore, the Patent Office is expected to become an attractive forum

107. 157 CONG. REC. E1208 (daily ed. June 24, 2011) (statement of Rep. Henry A.
Waxman arguing that supplemental examination is a “card” that, if played properly, will
encourage applicants to use a variety of strategies to obtain a patent that would not have been
available previously, and immunize such conduct before a competitor can challenge the patent).
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for patent challengers.
Any party, except the patent owner, may file a petition to
institute post-grant review within nine months from grant or reissue of
a patent as long as it is not challenging the patent’s validity in a civil
action.108 The petitioner may request cancellation of one or more
claims on any basis set forth in paragraphs two or three of § 282(b)
for invalidity, including for example, novelty, obviousness, written
description, enablement and statutory subject matter.109 The inter
partes review provision allows additional attacks on a patent’s
validity after the period during which post-grant review may be
initiated or, if post-grant review is initiated, at the conclusion of the
post-grant review.110 The basis for inter partes review is limited to
patents or printed publications, as in the current inter partes
reexamination process.111 While post-grant review provides a
petitioner a forum to challenge a patent on any basis of patentability,
inter partes review is limited to novelty and non-obviousness.112
The AIA raises the bar of entry for initiating a post-grant review
or inter partes review. Specifically, it mandates that the Director may
institute an inter partes review or a post grant review proceeding only
where a petitioner meets the threshold requirements.113 For an inter
partes review, the petitioner must demonstrate a “reasonable
likelihood” that he/she would prevail as to at least one of the claims
challenged.114 For a post-grant review, the petitioner must
demonstrate that it is “more likely than not” that at least one of the
claims challenged is unpatentable.115
Additionally, for a post-grant review, the petitioner may show a
novel or unsettled legal question that is important to other patents or
108. 35 U.S.C. § 321(a)-(c) (2011); Anthony C. Tridico & Erin M. Sommers, What’s Next
for the U.S.—The Metric System?: A Quick Look at the “Imminent” Major U.S. Patent Law
Reform,
CIPA
J.
(June
2011),
available
at
http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=df7a4aa5-9c71-4a8cb2b8-350c91d2bf00.
109. Id.
110. 35 U.S.C. § 311 (a)-(c).
111. Id. § 312.
112. Id. § 311(b).
113. See generally Justin A. Hendrix & Robert F. Shaffer, Post Grant Proceedings of the
AIA Provide New Opportunities and Require Reconsideration of Old Patent Litigation
Strategies,
MED.
DEVICE
(June
15,
2012),
available
at
http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=598696f7-7eba-4fcb83b8-2369caa91dd3.
114. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).
115. Id. § 324(a).
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patent applications.116 The “reasonable likelihood standard allows for
the exercise of discretion but encompasses a 50/50 chance whereas
the ‘more likely than not’ standard requires greater than a 50% chance
of prevailing.”117 For both post-grant and inter partes review, the
decision of the Patent Office whether to institute a review is final and
non-appealable.118
The current ex parte reexamination standard requires that a
substantial new question (SNQ) of patentability be raised; this
requirement is met in almost 95% of the reexamination requests
filed.119 The standards for post-grant and inter partes review are much
higher than the standard for ex parte reexamination. In view of the
higher bar for initiating inter partes post-issuance challenges at the
Patent Office; petitioners will likely have to set forth “the best ground
of unpatentability as to each challenged claim to facilitate early
resolution of the issues.”120
The AIA also provides that “[i]n determining whether to institute
or order a [post-grant] proceeding . . . , the Director may take into
account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same
or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were
presented to the Office.”121 This provision provides only a
discretionary duty to take into account the previously considered prior
art. Nevertheless, it is highly probable that it would factor into the
threshold determination, because failure to exercise the discretion
would invite harassment of patentees and misuse of Patent Office
resources.122 Chief Judge Smith’s explanation that “[i]n instituting an
[inter partes review] or [post-grant review], the Board may take into
116. Id. § 324(b).
117. Message from Chief Judge James Donald Smith, Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences: USPTO Discusses Key Aspects of New Administrative Patent Trials, USPTO.GOV,
http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/smith-blog-extravaganza.jsp (last modified May 21,
2012) [hereinafter Message from Chief Judge Smith].
118. 35 U.S.C. §§ 314(d), 324(e).
119. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 47 (2011) (“The threshold for initiating an inter partes
review is elevated from ‘significant new question of patentability’—a standard that currently
allows 95% of all requests to be granted—to a standard requiring petitioners to present
information showing that their challenge has a reasonable likelihood of success.”).
120. Message from Chief Judge Smith, supra note 117; see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(d),
325(d).
121. 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) (emphasis added).
122. See Scott A. McKeown, Will Post Grant Patent Proceedings Revisit Failed
Arguments?,
PATENTS
POST-GRANT
(Apr.
11,
2012),
http://www.patentspostgrant.com/lang/en/2012/04/will-post-grant-patent-proceedingsreconsider-failed-arguments.
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account whether the same or substantially same prior art or arguments
previously were presented to the Office,”123 further clarifies that the
Patent Office is unlikely to institute a post-grant proceeding on the
basis of previously-considered art. Accordingly, it is highly likely that
a petitioner will have to set forth prior art reference(s) or other
information that was previously not before the Patent Office to
institute a post-grant challenge; more so if the patent examiner had
previously applied the disclosed information for Office Action
rejections and those rejections were successfully traversed.124
Defending a post-issuance challenge at the Patent Office can be
needlessly expensive and time-consuming for a patentee. It can delay
enforcement or monetization of an issued patent. Therefore, there are
many incentives for patent owners to shore up their patent claims
against post-issuance validity challenges at the Patent Office by
proactively disclosing known material information during initial
examination, so that the same prior art is perhaps less likely to be
used later by an adversary to levy a post-issuance challenge at the
Patent Office.
b. Stronger Presumption of Validity over Prior Art
Considered by the Patent Office
Issued patents are “presumed valid” and the burden of
establishing invalidity rests on the party asserting such invalidity.125
The presumption of validity can be overcome only by clear and
convincing evidence, regardless of whether the prior art offered at

123. Message from Chief Judge Smith, supra note 117 (citing 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(d),
325(d)).
124. This appears to be in sharp contrast with the ex parte reexamination provision, which
remains as an option after AIA for challenging the validity of a patent at the Patent Office. Ex
parte reexamination allows the use of previously considered references (“old art”) to support a
SNQ if shown in a “new light.” See 35 U.S.C. § 303(a) (“The existence of a substantial new
question of patentability is not precluded by the fact that a patent or printed publication was
previously cited by or to the Office or considered by the Office.”); see also In re Swanson, 540
F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
125. See 35 U.S.C. § 282.
In general.—A patent shall be presumed valid. Each claim of a patent (whether in
independent, dependent, or multiple dependent form) shall be presumed valid
independently of the validity of other claims; dependent or multiple dependent
claims shall be presumed valid even though dependent upon an invalid claim.
The burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on
the party asserting such invalidity.
Id. § 282(a).
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trial was considered by the Patent Office.126 The logic underlying the
presumption is that the Patent Office has scrutinized the patent and
their expert judgment is entitled to deference by the courts.127
Although in theory the presumption of validity extends to both
disclosed and undisclosed prior art, the presumption appears to be
stronger when prior art was considered by the Patent Office and weak
when it was not.128
In the i4i case, appellant Microsoft and its amici argued that a
preponderance standard should apply where the evidence before the
fact finder was not before the Patent Office during the examination
process.129 Previously, in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.,130
the Supreme Court had called into question the application of the
presumption to prior art not considered by the Patent Office.131
However, in i4i, the Supreme Court rejected the idea of a two-tier
system for the presumption of validity and decided that the clear and
convincing evidence standard remains even for prior art not
considered by the Patent Office; but, added that when there is new
prior art asserted by a defendant during litigation, the jury should
ordinarily be given an instruction on that point.132 The Court
specifically endorsed the “commonsense principle that the Federal
126. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2243 (2011) (holding that under
35 U.S.C. § 282 the standard for patent invalidity is clear and convincing, not mere
preponderance of the evidence).
127. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven N. Sampat, Do Applicant
Patent Citations Matter? Implications for the Presumption of Validity 4-5 (Stanford Law Sch.,
John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 401, 2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1656568; Todd L. Juneau & Jill K. MacAlpine, Protecting Patents
from the Beginning: The Importance of Information Disclosure Statements During Patent
Prosecution, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 577, 580 (2000) (“Because a qualified
government agency, which includes one or more examiners who are assumed to have some
expertise in interpreting references and to be familiar with the level of skill in the art, is
presumed to have done its job properly, a very high level of deference is created.”).
128. See Cotropia et al., supra note 127, at 6-7.
129. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. at 2244.
130. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
131. Id. at 426 (stating that “the rationale underlying the presumption—that the PTO, in its
expertise, has approved the claim—seems much diminished here” with regard to art not before
the Patent Office).
132. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. at 2251-52.
When warranted, the jury may be instructed to consider that it has heard evidence
that the PTO had no opportunity to evaluate before granting the patent. . . . [T]he
jury may be instructed to evaluate whether the evidence before it is materially
new, and if so, to consider that fact when determining whether an invalidity
defense has been proved by clear and convincing evidence.
Id. at 2251.
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Circuit has recognized throughout its existence—namely, that new
evidence supporting an invalidity defense may ‘carry more weight’ in
an infringement action than evidence previously considered by the
PTO.”133
In i4i, the Supreme Court ultimately gives the jury the ability to
consider the presence of new evidence “when determining whether an
invalidity defense has been proved by clear and convincing
evidence.”134 Because judges and juries are not trained to understand
the technical details of the prior art, they are generally less likely to
second-guess the expertise of the patent examiner, and therefore, factfinders are far more receptive to arguments that the examiner never
considered a particular piece of prior art.135 Consequently, fact-finders
are more likely to invalidate a claim based on prior art not previously
considered by the Patent Office.
Although the presumption of validity and the clear and
convincing evidence standard for patent invalidity extends even to
undisclosed prior art, the strength of that presumption of validity, at
least in the minds of the fact-finder, is largely dependent on whether
the prior art was previously considered by the patent examiner.136
This provides significant incentive to patent applicants and
practitioners to bring all known material information to the attention
of the Patent Office to gain the complete benefit of the presumption of
validity afforded to an issued patent.
The above-described incentives—strengthening against postgrant challenges and perhaps strengthening the presumption of
validity—will continue to motivate patent applicants and practitioners
to bring material (and perhaps even marginally relevant information)
to the attention of the Patent Office during prosecution.
Additionally, disclosure of all known information during the
initial examination of a patent application provides protection against
discovery of undisclosed information during litigation as well as any
unpleasant questioning that could follow. Even if an applicant

133. Id. (quoting Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1360
(Fed. Cir. 1984), abrogated by Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276
(Fed. Cir. 2011)).
134. Id.
135. See Cotropia et al., supra note 127, at 6-7; Juneau & MacAlpine, supra note 127, at
580 (“Even if an infringer provides clear and convincing evidence of invalidity, there is an
additional burden of overcoming the deference given to the PTO by the courts.”).
136. See Cotropia et al., supra note 127, at 6-7; Juneau & MacAlpine, supra note 127, at
580.
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subjectively believes that certain information is not material to
patentability, discovery of intentional non-disclosure can give rise to
claims of inequitable conduct, thereby casting a cloud over the
patent’s validity, threatening the practitioner’s reputation, and
increasing the overall litigation costs.
From a litigation perspective, it is advantageous for patent
applicants and practitioners to disclose all known information during
prosecution, both material and marginally relevant ones, in order to
avoid the disruption that can follow from discovery of the same
information during litigation.
2. The “Egregious Misconduct” Loophole in Therasense
The Therasense court ratcheted up the materiality standard for
inequitable conduct, but recognized an exception to the requirement
for materiality, determining that “[w]hen the patentee has engaged in
affirmative acts of egregious misconduct, such as the filing of an
unmistakably false affidavit, the misconduct is material.”137 The Court
created this exception to strike a “necessary balance between
encouraging honesty before the [Patent Office] and preventing
unfounded accusations of inequitable conduct.”138 In both Therasense
and Home Depot, the Federal Circuit explained that applicant’s
misconduct must be an unequivocal act, such as the filing of a false
affidavit, to rise to the level of “affirmative egregious misconduct.”139
The Therasense court’s exception for egregious misconduct
appears to be extremely narrow and apply only to deliberately
planned and carefully executed schemes to defraud the Patent Office.
However, the Court has left the metes and bounds of this exception
largely vague. It is unclear whether extraordinary circumstances, such
as complete lack of diligence in submitting relevant information to the
Patent Office, or deliberate attempts to remain unaware of any
potentially relevant information, would fall within the exception.
As the contours of the egregious misconduct exception are
worked out in the forthcoming Federal Circuit and district court case
law, it is possible that many litigators will frame their allegations as
affirmative acts of “egregious misconduct” to continue to get the

137. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
138. Id. at 1293.
139. Powell v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 663 F.3d 1221, 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing
Therasense, Inc., 649 F.3d at 1290, 1292-93).
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benefits of the inequitable conduct defense.140 Therefore, it is
advisable for patent applicants and practitioners to keep their IDS
practices after Therasense essentially the same, except perhaps in the
instances where hundreds of redundant or immaterial references were
being submitted out of an overabundance of caution.
3. Economic Incentives to Continue with Pre-Therasense
IDS Practices
Patent applicants sometimes make large disclosures of
information during prosecution. Such profligate applicants form a
small fraction of the patent community and are generally limited to
specific technology areas.141 Therasense may persuade some of these
overzealous submitters to relax their IDS practices and submit fewer
immaterial or marginally relevant references. However, for the
average applicant citing a modest number of references, typically
from a pre-filing search, foreign search reports, or inventors’ personal
knowledge, Therasense may not significantly change their customary
IDS practices. This is primarily because the practice of overdisclosing is often less expensive to an applicant than determining the
materiality of all known references. By erring on the side of
submission, patent applicants and practitioners can not only enhance
their protection from inequitable conduct allegations, but also avoid
the cost associated with conducting materiality analysis of each and
every piece of reference brought to the attention of the applicant
and/or the practitioner. Such a practice essentially shifts the burden
and cost of materiality analysis to the Patent Office. Determination of
whether a piece of information is material is a complicated process.142
It is less risky to submit all known references remotely related to the
invention, regardless of whether the applicant or practitioner
subjectively believes it to be a “material” or “cumulative” reference,
so as to avoid a later charge of inequitable conduct arising from a
140. Johnson, supra note 20, at 204.
141. See generally Crouch & Rantanen, supra note 13 (noting that applicants submit over
200 references in only 2% of cases, and 15% of patented cases include absolutely no applicant
cited references).
142. Cotropia, supra note 3, at 767.
Determinations of whether a piece of information is material are difficult.
Materiality is a multi-step inquiry, involving the determination of each patent
claim’s meaning, analysis of the content of the information in question, and a
judgment as to whether the information is relevant to issues of novelty,
nonobviousness, or the disclosure requirements.
Id. (footnote omitted).

BHATTACHARYYA & MCGURK

5/20/2013 12:16 PM

SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.

634

[Vol. 29

different subjective understanding of that reference.143
There continues to be a strong incentive for applicants to be
over-inclusive in their IDS submissions out of a fear that undisclosed
prior art might be discovered during discovery and successfully
argued to be “but-for” material during litigation. Even if unsuccessful,
the patentee can have its credibility damaged with the fact-finder for
failing to disclose the reference.
Last but not the least, many applicants and practitioners already
have established procedures and sophisticated databases to track
references cited in counterpart foreign applications and/or in related
families of applications. They are less likely to dismantle such
established procedures for cross-citing references, especially given
that complete lack of diligence can potentially ensnare the applicant
in the egregious misconduct exception to the materiality standard.144
Considering all of the above discussed incentives to continue to
bring known information to the attention of the Patent Office, it seems
highly unlikely that the information submission activities of patent
applicants and practitioners will change significantly from their preTherasense practice.
B. Supplemental Examination Will Not Jeopardize the Duty of
Disclosure
The supplemental examination provision in the AIA is intended
to curtail allegations and findings of inequitable conduct. 145 The
provision provides a patentee with a powerful tool for strengthening
its patent against inequitable conduct charges before a patent
infringement action is initiated.146
It has been argued that the supplemental examination provision
will have a deleterious effect on patent quality because it effectively
creates a “patent amnesty program” encouraging patent applicants to
“obtain patents despite conduct that would be abhorrent under
traditional understandings of a patent applicant’s obligation to be
equitable in dealing with the public and with competitors.”147
Supplemental examination is framed as a means to encourage
applicants to violate their duty of candor by intentionally keeping the
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Johnson, supra note 20, at 208-09.
See supra Part III.A.2.
See Dolak, supra note 19, at 148.
See generally Jimenez & McNeill, supra note 97.
Jason Rantanen et al., supra note 19, at 244.
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Patent Office in the dark about prior art that would be detrimental to
the prosecution of their application, allowing parties to monetize a
patent that is known or suspected to be unpatentable, and thereafter
immunizing the parties from the misconduct using supplemental
examination if a licensee or competitor threatens litigation.148
Nothing in the above depicted scenario is absolutely new or
unique to the supplemental examination provision. For instance, it is
possible to cure an intentional non-disclosure via a reissue
application, although a reissue proceeding under 35 U.S.C. § 251 is
technically available only to correct unintentional errors which make
the patent invalid or inoperative. This is possible because recent
Federal Circuit case law has held that failure to include a dependent
claim is an error that is correctible by reissue.149 Since there is no
requirement to mention every single error, adding a dependent claim
and initiating a reissue could possibly provide an avenue for
correcting a non-disclosure problem, even though a patentee would
not be shielded from allegations of inequitable conduct stemming
from the conduct related to the error, as is the case with supplemental
examination.
Even if corrective measures are not available, a patent applicant
or a practitioner may still make a strategic decision to suppress or
misrepresent relevant information to try to maximize claim scope.
Since the patentee controls whether and when litigation begins
(absent enforcement efforts that can result in a declaratory judgment
action against the patentee), the unmerited claim scope has the
potential to deter market competition and innovation.150 Supplemental
examination is not likely to encourage or escalate such knowing
violations of the duty of disclosure at least because of the following
reasons.
1. Risk of Ex Parte Reexamination
It is highly doubtful that patent applicants or practitioners will
purposefully misrepresent or withhold relevant information that was
reasonably available during prosecution, and present the same
information to the Patent Office after issuance if a lawsuit appears on
148. Id. at 231, 244.
149. See In re Tanaka, 640 F.3d 1246, 1250-52 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that the addition
of dependent claims can be the sole basis for seeking a reissue application under 35. U.S.C.
§251 because it amounts to claiming less than the applicant has a right to claim and constitutes
an error that can be corrected by reissue).
150. Dolak, supra note 19, at 168.
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the horizon. Any competitive advantage gained from such a
calculated scheme to deceive the Patent Office will be short-lived,
because the Patent Office will automatically declare an ex parte
reexamination of the patent if a prior art reference presented in the
request for supplemental examination raises a substantial new
question (SNQ) of patentability.151 Moreover, the chances of ex parte
reexamination being prompted by the supplemental examination
request are substantially high because patent applicants are not likely
to initiate a costly and time-consuming supplemental examination
process unless they have reason to be concerned that the undisclosed
information will be found “but-for” material during litigation.152
A supplemental examination request introducing a “but-for”
material reference is very likely to raise a substantial new question of
patentability, consequently prompting an ex parte reexamination.
During reexamination, the affected claims will either have to be
canceled or amended to distinguish over the reference,153 resulting in
prosecution history estoppels and affecting claim scope under the
Doctrine of Equivalents.
Lastly, an ex parte reexamination proceeding takes a long time,
currently approximately 26.3 months from the filing of the request to
the grant of the ex parte certificate.154 To gain the shielding effect of
supplemental examination, the patentee will potentially have to delay
the start of litigation until reexamination is concluded.155
In view of the high likelihood of ex parte reexamination being
prompted by a supplemental examination request, a patentee has very
little to gain from deliberately withholding potentially material
information during prosecution and requesting supplemental
examination at a later date. Contrary to the concerns raised by many
critics, the supplemental examination provision was introduced in the
AIA to provide patent owners with recourse to cure previously
151. 35 U.S.C. § 257(b) (2011).
152. See, e.g., Warren D. Woessner, Supplemental Examination Decision Tree—Lots of
Dead
Branches?,
PATENTS4LIFE
(Jan.
31,
2012),
http://www.patents4life.com/2012/01/supplemental-examination-decision-tree-lots-of-deadbranches/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2012) (discussing that savvy patent applicants and practitioners
realize that after Therasense, a party alleging inequitable conduct must make distinct showings
of intent to deceive and but-for materiality, and therefore, they are less likely to initiate
supplemental examination if the undisclosed information is not likely to be found but-for
material).
153. Thurlow & Elbert, supra note 94, at 3.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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unknown defects in their patents and thwart untoward allegations of
inequitable conduct.
With or without supplemental examination, there will always be
some miscreant practitioners and applicants, who may knowingly
suppress or misrepresent relevant information and deceive the Patent
Office into issuing claims that should not have issued at all or issued
with narrower scope. Supplemental examination cannot be rightfully
blamed as encouraging such deceitful behavior, particular since any
leverage gained from the misconduct would be eviscerated during the
ex parte reexamination process.
2. The Fraud Provision in Supplemental Examination
The supplemental examination provision recognizes the
importance of the duty of candor to the Patent Office by making
supplemental examination unavailable where actual fraud has been
committed during the initial examination of the patent.156 The AIA
provides that if the Director of the Patent Office becomes aware
during the supplemental examination or reexamination “that a
material fraud on the Office may have been committed in connection
with the patent that is the subject of the supplemental
examination . . . , the Director shall also refer the matter to the
Attorney General for such further action as the Attorney General may
deem appropriate.”157 While this provision is untested, the possibility
of criminal sanctions could further deter practitioners and patent
applicants from committing fraud on the Patent Office during the
initial examination of the patent.
3. Cost Associated with Supplemental Examination
The supplemental examination process is expected to be costly.
On August 14, 2012, the Patent Office published the final Rules and
Regulations for implementing the supplemental examination
provision of the AIA.158 According to the Rules, the Patent Office will
charge $5,140 for conducting supplemental examination of up to 12
items of information believed to be relevant to the patent.159 If the
request for supplemental examination raises a substantial new
156. See generally Jimenez & McNeill, supra note 97.
157. 35 U.S.C. § 257(e) (2011).
158. Changes to Implement the Supplemental Examination Provisions of the Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act and to Revise Reexamination Fees, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,828 (Aug. 14, 2012)
(to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
159. Id. at 48,831.
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question of patentability, the Patent Office will initiate an ex parte
reexamination. The patentee must submit an additional $16,120 for
conducting ex parte reexamination when submitting the request for
supplemental examination, which would be refunded if the request
does not raise a substantial new question of patentability.160 Thus, the
total up-front cost of filing a supplemental examination request
would, at a minimum, be $21,260. If the patentee needs to have more
than 12 items of information considered, the Rules require the
patentee to submit a separate request and an additional $21,260 in
fees. In addition, the Patent Office proposes to charge $170 for each
non-patent document having from 21 to 50 sheets and $280 for each
additional 50-sheet increment or a fraction thereof.161 All in all,
supplemental examination is expected to be very expensive. The cost
associated with this process will certainly deter misuse or overuse of
this provision, particularly abuse of the provision to cure knowing and
deliberate omissions during the initial examination.
Accordingly, patent applicants and practitioners have many
reasons, viz. the risk of reexamination, the fraud provision, and the
cost associated with requesting supplemental examination, to err on
the side of full disclosure to the Patent Office during initial
examination. If relevant information is inadvertently withheld from
the Office, supplemental examination will rightly insulate such
inadvertent omission from an attack of inequitable conduct.
It seems highly unlikely that changes in the inequitable conduct
landscape, as a result of Therasense and supplemental examination,
will corrupt the patent system and suppress flow of relevant
information to the Patent Office. On the contrary, overflow of
information to the Patent Office is likely to continue to an appreciable
extent, because the costs and risks associated with under-disclosure
are enormous, while there are minimal disincentives for overdisclosure. The problem of over-disclosure has to be addressed by the
Patent Office in other ways.
C. Suggestions to the Patent Office for Deterring OverDisclosure
The majority in Therasense reasoned that if the materiality
standard for finding inequitable conduct is raised, patent applicants
and practitioners would no longer be motivated to inundate the Patent
160.
161.

Id.
Id.
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Office with marginally relevant information out of an abundance of
caution.162 The Patent Office echoed similar views when it proposed
to raise the materiality standard for the duty to disclose under Rule
56.163
There is a very slim possibility that patent applicants and
practitioners will change their information submission practice in
view of the Patent Office’s proposed “but-for-plus” standard of
materiality. This is primarily because at present there are no
deterrents to over-citing in the proposed amendments to Rule 56.
Many patent applicants and practitioners are likely to conclude that it
is easier, more cost-effective, and less risky to just disclose
everything, especially from related applications, than sorting through
all the references and making a judgment on materiality. To add to
this problem of over-citing, the Federal Circuit raised the standard for
finding deceptive intent in Therasense, which is likely to lower the
chances of finding inequitable conduct on the ground that the relevant
reference was buried amongst far less relevant references. It is
uncertain whether deceptive intent can be the single most reasonable
inference that can be drawn from evidence that a material reference
was cloaked or buried by an enormous amount of marginal or
cumulative references.164 Therefore, currently there are no
disincentives for over-compliance with the duty of disclosure. As
such, the problem of over-disclosure is likely to persist unless the
Patent Office adds more teeth to their information disclosure
requirements.
One effort to do this was made by the Patent Office in July 2006
when it published a set of proposed rules regarding the IDS
practice.165 The proposed changes to the IDS requirements were
162. See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1291 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
163. See Revision of the Materiality to Patentability Standard for the Duty to Disclose
Information in Patent Applications, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,631, 43,631 (July 21, 2011) (to be codified
at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
164. See, e.g., Cordis Corp. v. Bos. Scientific Corp., 658 F.3d 1347, 1353, 1361 (Fed. Cir.
2011). Under the Therasense standard, specific intent to deceive must be the single most
reasonable inference able to be drawn from the evidence. Therasense, Inc., 649 F.3d at 1290. In
Cordis, the applicant submitted a material reference in an IDS with 60 other references and
without emphasis. Cordis, 658 F.3d at 1353. The district court found, and the Federal Circuit
affirmed, that defendants had failed to prove deceptive intent by clear and convincing evidence.
Id. at 1361. The evidence of record, including the instance of burying the material reference,
failed to unequivocally demonstrate specific intent to deceive. Id. Applicant’s patents were
found to be not unenforceable due to inequitable conduct. Id.
165. Changes to Information Disclosure Statement Requirements and Other Related
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challenged in court; they were ultimately withdrawn by the Obama
administration.166 The 2006 Proposed Rules suggested that only IDSs
with a limited number of cites (20 or less) can be submitted before
first Office Action without any “additional disclosure” requirement.
Large cites (more than 25 pages) or foreign language documents, and
IDSs submitted after first Office action must meet increasing
“additional disclosure” requirements.167 The primary objective of the
proposed 2006 Patent Office Rules was to reduce the number of
references cited in an IDS such that only the most pertinent references
were being brought to the attention of the Patent Office.
Under the Patent Office’s current IDS requirements, there are no
numerical limits on the number of references that can be filed in an
IDS, no page restrictions on filing of large documents, and no extra
fees levied for filing large IDSs. In other words, the current rules
provide no deterrent to over-citing. Therefore, applicants and
practitioners tend to over-comply with their duty of disclosure,
because the cost of over-compliance is minimal compared to the cost
of under-compliance.168
In light of the heightened standard of materiality for inequitable
conduct and the duty of disclosure, the Patent Office should consider
revisiting the 2006 Rules and implementing new IDS requirements
that would shift the burden of determining materiality to the
applicants. By making IDS submission more costly, applicants will be
encouraged to review the prior art and submit only those references
that are relevant to examination and patentability. The Patent Office
can, for example, require applicants to pay fees for documents
comprising an excessive number of pages or references. As was
previously proposed in the 2006 Rules, the Patent Office can also
require applicants to submit an explanation of the cited references if
an IDS contains more than twenty references. Another alternative
would be to require applicants to emphasize the most relevant
reference(s) on the IDS if they are submitting more than twenty
references. Such actions by the Patent Office will impose a
responsibility on the applicant or practitioner to sort through the prior
art, assess the materiality of the references, and submit only the

Matters, 71 Fed. Reg. 38,808, 38,808-823 (proposed July 10, 2006) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R.
pt. 1).
166. Cotropia et al., supra note 127, at 24.
167. Changes to Information Disclosure Statement Requirements, 71 Fed. Reg. at 38,808.
168. See Cotropia, supra note 3, at 767-68.
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relevant references in order to keep the number of cited references
under twenty.
In short, the Patent Office should consider further actions to
deter patent applicants and practitioners from flooding the Patent
Office with marginal or barely relevant references; otherwise the
problem of over-disclosure will not be solved.
In the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Proposed Rules)
published on July 21, 2011, the Patent Office announced that it is
“considering further actions that may provide an incentive for
applicants to assist the Office by explaining/clarifying the relationship
of prior art to the claimed invention.”169 The 2011 Proposed Rules
further states that the Patent Office “believes it is worthwhile to
explore ways to encourage applicants to submit information, beyond
that required under the Therasense materiality standard, that would be
helpful and useful in advancing examination.”170 It is yet to be seen
what actions the Patent Office is considering to incentivize applicants
to be forthcoming with information, while deterring applicants from
over-citing. The patent community can at least have some assurance
that the Patent Office is cognizant of the deficiencies in their current
IDS requirements and is contemplating further actions to require more
applicant participation in the examination process, limit overdisclosure of information, and ultimately improve the quality of the
patent examination process.
IV. CONCLUSION
Therasense heightened the standards for materiality and intent
required for a finding of inequitable conduct, and the Patent Office
subsequently proposed to revise the materiality standard for the duty
of disclosure to “match”171 the materiality standard for inequitable
conduct. Despite these changes in the materiality standards, patent
applicants and practitioners are unlikely to change their preTherasense IDS practices, because there are many additional
incentives within the patent system for applicants and practitioners to
be over-inclusive in information disclosure to the Patent Office. The
supplemental examination provision of the AIA is also not likely to

169. Revision of the Materiality to Patentability Standard for the Duty to Disclose
Information in Patent Applications, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,631, 43,632 (proposed July 21, 2011) (to be
codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
170. Id. at 43,633.
171. Id. at 43,631.
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promote intentional breaches of the duty of disclosure and repress
information submission to the Patent Office. Accordingly, Therasense
and supplemental examination is not likely to result in diminution in
the amount of information submitted to the Patent Office for
examination. To solve the problem of over-disclosure, the Patent
Office must consider revising its current IDS requirements to actively
deter patent applicants and practitioners from overwhelming the
Patent Office with immaterial or marginally material references.

